Foreign Affairs Federalism The Myth of National Exclusivity 1st Edition by Michael Glennon, Robert Sloane 0199941491 9780199941490

Foreign Affairs Federalism: The Myth of National Exclusivity 1st Edition by Michael J. Glennon, Robert D. Sloane  – Ebook PDF Instant Download/DeliveryISBN: 0199941491, 9780199941490

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ISBN-10 :  0199941491 

ISBN-13 :  9780199941490

Author:  Michael J. Glennon, Robert D. Sloane 

Challenging the myth that the federal government exercises exclusive control over U.S. foreign-policymaking, Michael J. Glennon and Robert D. Sloane propose that we recognize the prominent role that states and cities now play in that realm. Foreign Affairs Federalism provides the first comprehensive study of the constitutional law and practice of federalism in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. It could hardly be timelier. States and cities recently have limited greenhouse gas emissions, declared nuclear free zones and sanctuaries for undocumented immigrants, established thousands of sister-city relationships, set up informal diplomatic offices abroad, and sanctioned oppressive foreign governments. Exploring the implications of these and other initiatives, this book argues that the national interest cannot be advanced internationally by Washington alone. Glennon and Sloane examine in detail the considerable foreign affairs powers retained by the states under the Constitution and question the need for Congress or the president to step in to provide “one voice” in foreign affairs. They present concrete, realistic ways that the courts can update antiquated federalism precepts and untangle interwoven strands of international law, federal law, and state law. The result is a lucid, incisive, and up-to-date analysis of the rules that empower-and limit-states and cities abroad.

Foreign Affairs Federalism: The Myth of National Exclusivity 1st Table of contents:

1. Why Empower States?
I. The Origins of American Federalism
II. Federalism in the New Constitution
III. The Functional Rationale for Federalism
A. The Case for the States
1. Freedom
2. Efficiency
3. Innovation
B. The Case against the States
1. The Inapplicability of the Traditional Federalist Rationales
2. The Danger of Retaliation against the Entire Nation
IV. Assessment
2. States, Cities, and Globalization
I. The Globalization Driver
II. Federal Incapacity
III. State Capacity
IV. State Activities in the International Realm
A. Compacts and Agreements with Foreign Countries
B. Adoption of International Standards
C. State Offices in Foreign Countries
D. State Representatives to Foreign Countries
E. State Incentives to Attract Foreign Business
F. Sister-City Relationships
G. State Foreign Policy Statements
H. State Economic Sanctions and Trade Bans
I. “Buy American” Requirements
J. State Taxation of Foreign Businesses
K. State Restrictions on Immigrants
L. State Regulatory Prohibitions and Restrictions
V. Conclusion
3. Constitutional Methodology and the Role of the Courts
I. Constitutional Methodology
II. The Role of the Courts
4. Dormant Foreign-Affairs Preemption
I. Introduction
II. Origins
A. Holmes v. Jennison 
B. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 
C. Clark v. Allen
III. Invention of the Dormant Foreign-Affairs Doctrine
A. Zschernig v. Miller (1968) and Its Progeny
B. American Insurance Ass’nv. Garamendi 
IV. Assessment
A. Federal Exclusivity
1. Per Se Federal Exclusivity
2. Balancing Tests
B. Judicial Abstention
C. Alternative Limiting Principles
1. State Motive
2. State Negotiation with a Foreign Government
3. Sitting in Judgment on a Foreign Government
4. Challenges to Federal National Security Policy
5. Traditional State Competence
V. Conclusion
5. Dormant Foreign Commerce Preemption
I. Evolution of the Dormant Interstate Commerce Clause
A. From Gibbons to Blackbird Creek
B. The Rise and Fall of the Cooley Doctrines
C. The Modern Standard: Philadelphia v. New Jersey and Pike v. Bruce Church
D. The Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause
II. Origins and Development of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
A. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles 
B. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board 
C. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios 
D. The Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
III. Assessment
Synthesizing and Simplifying Dormancy Standards
6. The Treaty Power
I. Introduction
II. The Treaty Clause Versus the Tenth Amendment?
III. Deciphering Holmes’s Cryptic Opinion in Holland
A. The Textual Rationale
B. The Force of Functionalism and Adaptivism in Holland
1. How Holmes Framed the Constitutional Question—And Why
2. Holland’s Functionalist Rationale
3. The Andrews Analogy
C. An Anachronism?
IV. How Bond Hobbled Holland
A. The Court’s Attempt to Sidestep Holland
B. Why the Court’s Attempt to Sidestep Holland Failed
1. The Neglect of Holland’s Own Federalism Principles
2. Holland’s Uniform Standard: Treaties and Implementing Legislation
3. The Unavoidable Conflict Between Holland and Bond
4. Bond’s Misguided “Background Principle”
5. Carey v. South Dakota: The Constitutional Avoidance Canon in Context
V. Critiques of Holland: Theory and Practice
A. Before Bond: States’ Rights, Individual Rights, and the Lessons of History, Experience, and Jurisprudence
B. The Political and Legal Limits of Holland
1. Political Constraints: A Short, Not-So-Horrible Parade
2. Legal Constraints: The Scope of Holland
VI. Holland and the Modern Law of Treaties
A. After Bond: The Treaty Power and Federalism in Contemporary Perspective
B. What the Future Holds
C. The Postwar Revolution of Treaty Law
D. Medellín’s New Incoherence
E. U.S. Treaty Practice After Bond
VII. Conclusion
7. Federal Common Law and State Power
I. Introduction: Federal Common Law’s Status and Legitimacy
A. The Act of State Doctrine
B. Customary International Law
II. What is Customary International Law?
Where Does Customary International Law Fit into U.S. Federal and State Law?
III. Which Rules of Customary International Law Apply?
Federal—or State—Common Law?
IV. Assessment
8. Federal Approval: The Compact Clause
I. From the Clear to the Unclear
II. Contemporary Practice
III. The Problem Fades
IV. States’ Rights and the Compact Clause
V. Assessment
9. Federal Disapproval: Preemption
I. Preemption of State Law by Federal Statute
A. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council
B. Immigration
II. Preemption of State Law by Treaty
III. Preemption of State Law by Executive Agreement
A. Judicial Precedents
B. Analytic Options
IV. Assessment
10. A Case Study: States as Cyber-Defenders
I. The Growing Threat from Cyber-Intrusions
II. The Weakness of International Law
III. The Crazy Quilt of Federal Statutory Law
IV. The States Step into the Void
V. The Lawfulness of State Data Protection Initiatives
A. International Legal Concerns
B. Retaliation
C. Massachusetts Legal Concerns
D. Federal Constitutional Concerns
E. Due Process
F. Preemption
G. The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power
H. The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
I. The Market Participant Doctrine
VI. An Opening for State Entrepreneurship?
11. Conclusion
I. Summary
II. Foreign Affairs Federalism in Other Nations
A. Switzerland
B. Canada
C. Germany
D. India
III. Making Versus Interpreting a Constitution

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Tags: Foreign Affairs, Federalism, The Myth, National Exclusivity, Michael Glennon, Robert Sloane