Free Will and Action Explanation A Non Causal Compatibilist Account 1st Edition by Scott Sehon 0191076176 9780191076176

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ISBN-10 :  0191076176 

ISBN-13 :  9780191076176

Author:  Scott Sehon 

Do we have free will and moral responsibility? Is free will compatible with determinism? Scott Sehon argues that we can make progress on these questions by focusing on an underlying issue: the nature of action explanation. When a person acts, or does something on purpose, we explain the behavior by citing the agent’s reasons. The dominant view in philosophy of mind has been to construe such explanations as a species of causal explanation. Part I of the book proposes and defends a non-causal account of action and agency, according to which reason explanation of human behavior is irreducibly teleological rather than causal. Part II applies the teleological account of action to free will and responsibility, arguing that the free actions–the ones for which we are directly responsible–are the goal-directed actions, the actions that are teleologically explicable in terms of our reasons. It is then argued that this non-causal account of action undermines the appeal of incompatibilist arguments, arguments attempting to show that free will is not compatible with determinism. Beyond this, Sehon argues that the non-causal compatibilist account works well in practice: it is in accord with our clear intuitions about cases, and it both explains and provides guidance in the cases where our intuitions are murkier.

Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal, Compatibilist Account 1st Table of contents:

1. What’s at Stake in the Free Will Debate?
1.1 Criticism and Punishment
1.2 Praise and Reward
1.3 Reactive Attitudes
1.4 Free Will vs. Moral Responsibility
Part I. The Teleological Account of Action
2. Teleology and Interpretation
2.1 Reason Explanation as Irreducibly Teleological
2.2 Rationalizability and Interpretation
2.3 Some Illustrative Examples
2.4 Multiple Goals
2.5 Omissions
2.6 Degrees of Goal-direction
3. Rationalizability and Irrationality
3.1 Emotions and Agency
3.2 Irrational Actions
3.3 Irrational Agents
4. Other Objections to the Teleological Account
4.1 Mele’s Objection: Norm and the Martians
4.2 First Person Perspective and Transparency
4.3 The Truthmaker Worry
4.4 Simplicity and Mystery
5. Rationalizing Principles and Causal Explanation
5.1 The Systematic and Unavoidable Use of Rationalizing Principles
5.2 The Need for a Causalist Explanation
5.3 Possible Causalist Explanations
6. Deviant Causal Chains
6.1 The Nature of the Problem
6.2 A Suggested Solution from Mele
6.3 Schlosser and Causation by Content
6.4 Aguilar and Reliability
6.5 Conclusion
7. The Commitments of Common-Sense Psychology
7.1 The Basic Argument
7.2 First Premise: Nature of the Causal Theory of Action
7.3 The Second Premise: Causation and Reification
7.4 The Third Premise: Reification and Existence
7.5 The Argument Revised
Part II. The Teleological Account of Free Will and Responsibility
8. Application to Free Will: Non-Causal Compatibilism
8.1 The Basic Proposal
8.2 Determinism and Freedom
8.3 Degrees of Freedom
8.4 The Philosophers’ Distinctions
9. Irrational Actions and Freedom
9.1 Stupid Behavior
9.2 Immoral Actions
9.3 Weakness of Will
9.4 Conclusion
10. Extraordinary Cases
10.1 Frankfurt Cases
10.2 Psychopaths
10.3 Coercion
10.4 Brainwashing
10.5 Conclusion
11. How the Teleological Account Undermines Arguments for Incompatiblism
11.1 Kane’s “Ultimate Responsibility” Argument
11.2 The “Completely Fixed” Argument
11.3 The Consequence Argument
11.4 Fischer and the Basic Argument
11.5 “Could Have Done Otherwise” Argument
11.6 Manipulation Arguments: Pereboom’s Four Cases
11.7 Conclusion
12. Epistemic Problems for Other Accounts of Free Will
12.1 Kane
12.2 Fischer and Ravizza
12.3 An Objection Considered
12.4 Conclusion
13. Concluding Thoughts
13.1 Isn’t It Obvious?
13.2 The Irrelevance of Determinism in Ordinary Practice
13.3 The Appeal of Incompatibilism
13.4 Wittgenstein’s Fly-bottle

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Tags: Free Will, Action Explanation, Non Causal, Compatibilist, Scott Sehon