On What Matters Volume Three 1st Edition by Derek Parfit 0191084379 9780191084379

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ISBN-10 :  0191084379 

ISBN-13 : 9780191084379

Author: Derek Parfit 

Derek Parfit presents the third volume of On What Matters, his landmark work of moral philosophy. Parfit develops further his influential treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. He engages with his critics, and shows the way to resolution of their differences. This volume is partly about what it is for things to matter, in the sense that we all have reasons to care about these things. Much of the book discusses three of the main kinds of meta-ethical theory: Normative Naturalism, Quasi-Realist Expressivism, and Non-Metaphysical Non-Naturalism, which Derek Parfit now calls Non-Realist Cognitivism. This third theory claims that, if we use the word ‘reality’ in an ontologically weighty sense, irreducibly normative truths have no mysterious or incredible ontological implications. If instead we use ‘reality’ in a wide sense, according to which all truths are truths about reality, this theory claims that some non-empirically discoverable truths-such as logical, mathematical, modal, and some normative truths-raise no difficult ontological questions. Parfit discusses these theories partly by commenting on the views of some of the contributors to Peter Singer’s collection Does Anything Really Matter? Parfit on Objectivity. Though Peter Railton is a Naturalist, he has widened his view by accepting some further claims, and he has suggested that this wider version of Naturalism could be combined with Non-Realist Cognitivism. Parfit argues that Railton is right, since these theories no longer deeply disagree. Though Allan Gibbard is a Quasi-Realist Expressivist, he has suggested that the best version of his view could be combined with Non-Realist Cognitivism. Parfit argues that Gibbard is right, since Gibbard and he now accept the other’s main meta-ethical claim. It is rare for three such different philosophical theories to be able to be widened in ways that resolve their deepest disagreements. This happy convergence supports the view that these meta-ethical theories are true. Parfit also discusses the views of several other philosophers, and some other meta-ethical and normative questions.

On What Matters Volume Three 1st Table of contents:

Part Seven Irreducibly Normative Truths
37 How Things Might Matter
128 Caring and Having Reasons to Care
129 Philosophical Disagreements
38 Non-Realist Cognitivism
130 Meta-Ethics
131 Ontology
39 Normative and Natural Truths
132 Concepts and Properties
133 The Co-Extensiveness Argument
134 The Normativity Objection
135 Scientific Analogies
136 The Triviality Objection
40 Gibbard’s Offer to Non-Naturalists
137 The Single Property Illusion
138 Naturalistic States of Affairs and Normative Truths
41 Railton’s Defence of Soft Naturalism
139 The Identity of Properties
140 Railton’s First Response to the Triviality Objection
42 Railton’s Resolution of Our Disagreements
141 Railton’s Wider View
142 What is Achieved by Railton’s Wider View
143 Railton’s Commentary
43 Jackson’s Non-Empirical Normative Truths
144 Jackson’s Co-Extensiveness Argument
145 Jackson’s Metaphysical Assumptions
44 Schroeder’s Conservative Reductive Thesis
146 Schroeder’s Criticisms of the Triviality Objection
147 How Schroeder and I Could Resolve our Disagreements
148 How I Misled Russell
Part Eight Expressivist Truths
45 Quasi-Realist Expressivism
149 Desires, Attitudes, and Beliefs
150 Earning the Right to Talk of Moral Truth
46 Gibbard’s Resolution of Our Disagreements
151 Gibbard’s Convergence Claim
152 Does it Matter Whether Things Matter?
153 Getting it Right
154 Gibbard’s Metaphysical Doubts
47 Another Triple Theory
155 Gibbard’s Commentary
156 A Happy Ending
Part Nine Normative and Psychological Reasons
48 Expressivist Reasons
157 Blackburn’s Bafflement
158 Blackburn’s Beliefs about Reasons
49 Subjectivist Reasons
159 Smith’s Defence of Subjectivism
160 Street’s Defence of Subjectivism
50 Street’s Meta-Ethical Constructivism
161 Street’s Debunking Arguments
162 Street’s Relativism
163 The Normative Implications of Street’s View
164 Chappell’s Claims about Street
51 Morality, Blame, and Internal Reasons
165 Darwall’s Claims about Internal Reasons
166 Darwall’s Defence of Moral Internalism
52 Nietzsche’s Mountain
167 Nietzsche and the Convergence Claim
Part Ten Ethics
53 What Matters and Universal Reasons
168 The Any-All Thesis
169 Universalism about What Matters
54 Conflicting Reasons
170 Sidgwick’s Problem
171 Moral and Self-interested Reasons
172 Other Problems
55 The Right and the Good
173 Moral Ambivalence
174 The Badness of Wrongdoing
175 Moral and Impartial Reasons
176 Wrongness and Reasons
56 Deontological Principles
177 The Means Principle
178 Harming and Saving from Harm
57 Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality
179 Good and Bad Ways of Treating People
180 Deontic and Non-Deontic Badness
181 Personal and Shared Duties
58 Towards a Unified Theory
182 Act Consequentialism
183 Rule and Motive Consequentialism
184 Optimific Motives and Rules
185 Small Effects and Great Harms
186 Inconclusive Conclusions

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