Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 13 1st Edition by Mark Timmons – Ebook PDF Instant Download/DeliveryISBN: 0198895923, 9780198895923
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ISBN-10 : 0198895923
ISBN-13 : 9780198895923
Author: Mark Timmons
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics (including moral realism, constructivism, and expressivism) to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE is an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 13 1st table of contents:
1. Paradoxical Proposals and Consent
1. Introduction
2. The theoretical challenge of paradoxical proposals
3. Distinguishing independent and introduced disincentives
4. My account’s first prong: the Worsening principle
5. My account’s second prong: taking advantage of vulnerability to unjustifiably set back interests
6. A further argument for my account’s second prong: the symmetry of initiating and accepting proposals
7. Conclusion
2. Manipulation, Disrespecting Autonomy, and Deliberative Projects
1. Introduction
2. The Significance of the Manipulee’s Deliberative Commitments
3. Disrespecting the Manipulee’s Deliberative Project
4. Conclusion
3. Moral Indifference
Introduction
1. Making Space for Moral Indifference
2. The Target of Moral Indifference: The Ability to Make a Moral Difference
3. The Distinct Wrong of Moral Indifference
4. Basic Second-Personal Regard
5. The Indifferent Stance
6. The Value of Moral Indifference
7. Conclusion
4. Buck-Passing and the Value of a Person
The Buck-Passing View of Value
The Value of a Person
Valuing, Loving, and the Wrong Kind of Reasons
Respect and Moral Reasons
The Value of a Person and Reasons for Attitudes
5. Moral Theorizing and the Limits of Coherence
Moral Virtue
A Second Form of Moral Incoherence?
Conclusion
6. A Contractualist Approach to Moral Uncertainty
1. Moral uncertainty and its implications
2. A contractualist approach to moral uncertainty principles
3. Content-neutral vs. discriminating moral uncertainty principles
4. Some advantages of local moral uncertainty principles
5. Conclusion
7. The Ethics of Expectations
1. The Nature of Expectations
2. The Wrongs of Expectations
3. The Ethics of Expectations
8. Satisficing Virtuously
1. Introduction
2. Problems for MC
3. Satisficing Proposals
4. Taking Stock
5. Virtue to the Rescue
6. Simplifying Advantageously
7. Some Assets of VT
8. Ultimate Explanation
9. Pro Tanto Rights and the Duty to Save the Greater Number
1. Directed deontic structure
2. A distinctive structure characteristic of rights
3. Defeat
4. An inference to the best explanation
5. Taurek cases
6. A deontological vindication of the Principle of Saving the Greater Number
7. Conclusion
10. Can’t Kant Count? Innumerate Views on Saving the Many over Saving the Few
1. The Specter of Numeracy
2. Saving the Few
3. Kantianism, Incomparability, and Choice Principles
4. Sweetening and No Defeat
5. Sweetening in the Dark
6. Kant to the Rescue
11. What Does Virtue Have to Do with Consequences?
1. Introduction
2. What non-viciousness teaches us about virtue
3. The consequentialist’s retort
4. The motivationalist’s retort
5. Conclusion
12. Two Conceptions of Rights
1. Preliminaries
2. Resultant and Contributory Conceptions of Rights
3. Adjudication and Resultant Rights
4. Moderate Deontology and Contributory Rights
5. Conflicts Among Contributory Rights
6. Constitutional Rights as Contributory Rights
7. New Contributory Rights
8. The Explanatory Role of Contributory Rights
9. Concluding Remarks
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Tags: Oxford Studies, Normative Ethics, Mark Timmons, ethical theory