Personal Identity as a Principle of Biomedical Ethics 1st Edition by Michael Quante 9783319568690 3319568698

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 The Concept of Person: Kinds of Usage

1.2 Personal Identity: Four Different Questions

1.3 Divergent Epistemological-Methodological Approaches

1.4 The Structure of the Study

Chapter 2: Human Persistence

2.1 Easy Solutions to a Complex Problem?

2.1.1 The Charge of Inadequacy

2.1.2 With the ‘Weapons’ of the Simple View

2.1.3 The Problem

2.1.4 Easy Alternatives?

2.2 Human Persistence: A Complex View

2.2.1 Causality: First Group of Presuppositions

2.2.2 Sortal Dependence: Second Group of Presuppositions

2.2.3 The Biological Approach

2.2.4 Conclusion

Chapter 3: The Beginning of Life

3.1 Targets

3.1.1 Preconditions

3.1.2 Targets

3.2 The Beginning of Life: Human Persistence (I)

3.2.1 When Did This Human Organism Begin to Exist?

3.2.1.1 Definition

3.2.1.2 Explanations

3.2.1.3 The Criterion of the Beginning of Life

3.2.1.4 Explanations

3.2.2 Objections

3.2.2.1 I’ll Come Later

3.2.2.2 I Was Here Already

3.2.3 The Graduality of Integration: The Hard Problem

3.3 Persistence, Potentiality and Personhood

3.3.1 The Bioethical ‘Guillotine’

3.3.2 The Debate on the Potentiality Argument

3.3.2.1 Three Main Objections

3.3.2.2 Potentiality in the Framework of the Biological Approach

3.4 The Ethical Relevance of the Beginning of Life

3.4.1 Contraception Vs. Abortion: Possible Vs. Potential Persons

3.4.2 Gene Therapy, Persistence and Personality

3.4.2.1 Interventions Before or After the Beginning of Life: A Decisive Difference

3.4.2.2 Genetic Identity: All or Nothing?

3.4.2.3 Genetic Identity and Personality

Chapter 4: Death

4.1 Targets

4.2 The Fight over the Definition of Death: Some Clarifying Considerations

4.2.1 The Background

4.2.2 Criteria of Death: Three Candidates

4.2.3 Three Levels of the Problem

4.2.4 Three Strategies

4.2.5 Further Differences

4.3 Death: Human Persistence (II)

4.3.1 Definition

4.3.2 Explanations and Modifications

4.3.3 The Criterion of Death for Human Organisms

4.4 Criticism of Alternative Approaches

4.4.1 The Moral Strategy

4.4.1.1 The Moral Argument

4.4.1.2 Criticism of the Moral Strategy

4.4.2 The Subject of Human Death

4.4.2.1 The Ontological Strategy

4.4.2.2 The Biological Strategy

4.5 Objections and Open Questions

4.5.1 Objections

4.5.2 Open Questions

4.6 Persistence and Biomedical Ethics: A Brief Conclusion

Chapter 5: Personality and Autonomy

5.1 Targets

5.2 Personality

5.2.1 Is Identity Important?

5.2.2 Personality and the Question of the Identity of the Person Over Time

5.2.3 The Double Meaning of Identification

5.3 Personality and Autonomy

5.3.1 Personality as Precondition of Autonomy

5.3.1.1 The Hierarchic Model

5.3.1.2 The Biographical Dimension

5.3.1.3 The Externalist Dimension

5.3.2 Autonomy as Precondition of Personality?

5.3.2.1 Borderline Cases of Personal Autonomy

5.3.2.2 Autonomy, Authenticity and Personality

5.4 The Principle of Respect for Autonomy

5.4.1 Beauchamp’s Theory of Autonomy of Agency

5.4.1.1 From Personal Autonomy to Autonomy of Agency

5.4.1.2 Beauchamp’s Model of Autonomy of Agency

5.4.2 The Tacit Preconditions for Autonomy of Agency

5.4.3 The Principle of Respect for Autonomy

Chapter 6: Dying Autonomously

6.1 Targets and Preliminary Clarifications

6.2 The Value of Life, the Personality and the ‘Right’ to Die

6.2.1 The Argument

6.2.2 The Value of Life According to John Harris

6.2.3 Voluntary Euthanasia and Personal Autonomy

6.3 The Categorical Objection

6.3.1 The Objection

6.3.2 Subtle Distinctions?

6.3.3 Sanctity of Life and Plural Society: First Conclusion

6.4 Gradualist Objections

6.4.1 Four Objections

6.4.1.1 The Objection by Grisez and Boyle

6.4.1.2 Müller’s Objection

6.4.1.3 Bok’s Objection

6.4.1.4 Beauchamp’s Objection

6.4.2 The Social Context of Voluntary Euthanasia: Second Conclusion

6.5 Is There a Duty to Kill?

6.5.1 A Duty to Kill?

6.5.2 Who Has Veto Rights?

6.5.3 Dying Autonomously: A Closing Conclusion

Chapter 7: Extended Autonomy

7.1 Targets

7.2 Personal Identity, Autonomy and the Passage of Time

7.2.1 The Perspectivity of the Terminology

7.2.2 Types of Case

7.3 Limits to Extended Autonomy?

7.3.1 The Problem of Implementation

7.3.2 The “Do no harm!” Objection

7.3.3 The Assumption of Non-identity

7.4 Conflicts Within Personal Autonomy

7.4.1 Ulysses Contracts

7.4.2 Paternalism or Self-Paternalism?

7.5 The Ethical Relevance of Biographical Identity

7.5.1 Self-Commitment and Coherence

7.5.2 Restoration Versus Installation

Chapter 8: Medical Paternalism

8.1 Targets of Proof

8.2 A Definition of Medical Paternalism

8.2.1 The Definition

8.2.2 Elucidation of the Individual Conditions

8.3 Strong and Weak Paternalism? Beauchamp’s Criticism of Feinberg

8.3.1 Feinberg’s Distinction

8.3.2 Beauchamp’s Criticism

8.3.3 Three Objections

8.3.4 A Possible Basis for Beauchamp’s Argumentation

8.4 Personality as Reason for Justification

8.4.1 Personality-Based Justifications of Paternalistic Action

8.4.2 Anticipated Consent

8.4.2.1 Forms of Consent

8.4.2.2 Types of Cases

8.5 From Paternalism to Cooperation – A Brief Conclusion

Chapter 9: The Interlacing of Persistence and Personality