Great Powers Weak States and Insurgency Explaining Internal Threat Alliances 1st Edition by Patrick 3319474197 9783319474199

Great Powers Weak States and Insurgency Explaining Internal Threat Alliances 1st Edition Patrick Quirk – Ebook Instant Download/Delivery ISBN(s): 9783319474199, 3319474197

Product details:

• ISBN 10:  3319474197
• ISBN 13:  9783319474199
• Author: Patrick

This book offers an original and theoretically rich examination into the dynamics of alliances that great powers and weak states form to defeat threats, such as rebellion or insurgency, within the smaller state’s borders. The author examines contemporary examples of such “internal threat alliances,” including Russia’s collaboration with Syria’s Assad regime to defeat anti-government rebels and U.S. cooperation with Afghanistan’s ruling political elite to combat the Taliban. In each case, the weaker state’s leadership wanted to remain in power while the great power sought to safeguard its interests linked to the regime’s stability. The book adds to International Relations (IR) theory by presenting a distinct conceptual framework that explains why internal threat alliances form, why some are more cohesive than others, and why some are effective while others are not. It thus promises to be of interest to IR scholars and students working in the areas of security studies, alliance dynamics, political violence, and civil war, but also to policy-makers grappling with how to salvage interests, such as access to natural resources or regional stability, imperiled by violence in weak states.

Table of contents:

Chapter 1: Internal Threat Alliances: A New Conceptual Framework

Theoretical and Policy Relevance

The Argument

Traditional Military Alliances

Cooperation to Balance External Threats

Alliance Formation: External Threat to the National Interest

Bandwagoning: Either Balance or Bandwagon

Alliance Effectiveness: Sufficient Resources to Thwart a Common Enemy

Gap in the Literature

The Argument

Internal Threat Alliances: A New Conceptual Framework

Alliance Formation

Why the Weak State’s Leaders Align

Why the Great Power Aligns

Why and When Actors Bandwagon

Alliance Effectiveness: Sufficient Resources and Ability to Curb Subnational Bandwagoning

Lessons for Policy

Conclusions

Roadmap for the Remainder of the Book

Notes

Chapter 2: US–Colombia Internal Threat Alliance (1980–2010)

US–Colombia Internal Threat Alliance (1980–2010): Historical Overview

From the “Brink of Collapse” to “Turning the Tide”

Characteristics of the Colombian State: Internal Fragmentation, Multiple Actors, and Competing In

Alliance Formation

Profile of the Internal Threat: Insurgents and Narco-traffickers Imperiling Regime Survival and

Evolution of the “Narco-Guerrilla” Threat

Why the USA and Colombia Aligned: To Safeguard the Regime and US Interests Associated With It

External and Internal Threats (1981–1989): Reagan [USA] and Turbay, Betancur [Colombia]

The Shift to Internal Threat Alliance (1989–1993): Bush [US] and Barco [Colombia]

Bandwagoning

Bandwagoning to Survive: Defections and Diverting Alliance Resources

Bandwagoning for Power and Patron: Self-Interest Over National Interest

Circumventing Bandwagoning Regime Actors

Alliance Effectiveness

“To the Brink of Collapse”: Low Alliance Effectiveness (1980–1998)

Betancur (1982–1986): Close Alignment Morphs from Political Liability to Asset

Barco (1986–1990): Political Interests Push Regime/USA into “Golden Embrace”

Gaviria (1990–1994): Cooperation Increases to Quash “Narco-­Terrorism Plague”

Samper (1994–1998): Central Regime Bandwagons, Sends Alliance into Tailspin

Alliance Effectiveness Remains Low as Samper Steps Down

“Turning the Tide”: Higher Alliance Effectiveness (1998–2010)

Uribe (2002–2010): Regime Needs Resources to Secure (Unprecedented) Re-election

Alliance Effectiveness Soars Under Pastrana, Uribe

Case Conclusions

 

Chapter 3: US–Afghanistan Internal Threat Alliance (2001–2012)

US–Afghanistan Internal Threat Alliance (2001–2012): Historical Overview

Characteristics of the Afghan State: Internal Fragmentation, Multiple Actors, and Competing Inter

Alliance Formation

Profile of the Internal Threat: Insurgents Imperiling Regime Survival and US Interests

The Insurgent Threat

Why the USA and Afghanistan Aligned: To Safeguard the Regime and US Interests Associated With

George W. Bush (2001–2009) and Hamid Karzai: Regime Survival to Balance Terrorism

Barack H. Obama (2008–2012) and Hamid Karzai: Regime Survival to Balance Terrorism

Bandwagoning

Bandwagoning to Survive: Defections and Diverting Alliance Resources

Bandwagoning for Profit: Switching to the Winning Side to Share in Spoils of Victory

“Green-On-Blue” Bandwagoning

Bandwagoning for Power and Patron: Self-Interest over National Interest

Bandwagoning Enables bin Laden’s Escape

“Warlords” Bandwagon to Safeguard Subnational Fiefdoms

Ministries of Interior (and Police) and Defense (and Army) Bandwagoning

Powerful Provincial Figures Bandwagon to Expand Power, Influence

Alliance Effectiveness

Karzai and Bush, Early Days: Regime Priorities Smooth Path for Strategy Agreement

Karzai’s Desire to Consolidate Authority Drives Him Closer to Bush (2004–2006)

Karzai’s Political Interests Undercut Alliance Gains (2006–2008)

Karzai and Obama: “Bandwagoning for Ballots” Drives Allies Apart

U.S. Tries to “Make Nice,” but Karzai Continues to Bandwagon

Karzai’s “Pendulum Approach” to Curbing Bandwagoning

“Feathering His Own Nest”: Karzai Diverts Resources to Bolster Power

Alliance Effectiveness Remains Low as Obama’s First Term Ends

Case Conclusions

 

Chapter 4: Russia–Syria Internal Threat Alliance (2010–2016)

Russia–Syria Internal Threat Alliance (2010–2016): Historical Overview

Characteristics of the Syrian State: Sectarian Tension, Fragmented Opposition, and Regional and

Alliance Formation

Profile of the Internal Threat: Anti-regime Forces Threaten Russian Interests

Evolution of the Internal Threat

Free Syrian Army

Islamic Front

Jabhat al-Nusra

ISIS/ISIL

Why Russia and Syria Aligned: To Safeguard the Regime and Russian Interests Associated With It

Vladimir Putin and Bashar al-Assad: Regime Survival to Serve Geopolitical Interests

Vladimir Putin and Bashar al-Assad: Regime Survival and Commercial Interests

Vladimir Putin and Bashar al-Assad: Regime Survival and Strategic Military Interests

Bandwagoning

Bandwagoning to Survive: Defections for Self-Preservation

Bandwagoning for Profit: Switching to the “Winning” Side to Share in Spoils of Victory

Bandwagoning for Patron: Defections to Protect Fellow Sunnis; Regime Actors Funnel Arms for Their

Alliance Effectiveness

Effective Efforts to Limit Bandwagoning: Raising the Costs of Defection, Paying for Loyalty

Shifting the Balance of Power: Russian Military Resources Increase Alliance Effectiveness

Alliance Effectiveness Remains High as Conflict Enters Its Fifth Year

Case Conclusions

Notes

Chapter 5: Conclusions

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