Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12 1st Edition by Russ Shafer Landau ISBN 0198805076 9780198805076

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ISBN 10:    0198805076
ISBN 13: 978-0198805076
Author:   Russ Shafer-Landau   

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12 1st  Table of contents:

1. Locating Morality: Moral Imperatives as Bodily Imperatives

• 1.1 Claims of the Body
  Examining how moral imperatives relate to bodily experiences.
• 1.2 Queer Metaethical Theory
  Introduction to queer metaethics and its relationship to moral theory.
• 1.3 Conclusion: Queering the Subject?
  Reflection on how queer theory challenges traditional moral subjectivity.

2. Difficult Cases and the Epistemic Justification of Moral Belief

• 2.1 Difficult Moral Cases
  Discussing moral dilemmas and their complexity in ethical reasoning.
• 2.2 Objections and Replies
  Addressing objections to the epistemic justification of moral beliefs.
• 2.3 Consequences for Moral Epistemology and Moral Metaphysics
  Analyzing the impact on moral epistemology and metaphysics.

3. Moral Testimony: Going on the Offensive

• 3.1 to 3.7
  Exploring moral testimony, the challenges, and responses in moral discourse.

4. Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities

• 4.1 Non-naturalism and the Supervenience Objection
  Discussing the objection against non-naturalism through supervenience.
• 4.2 Fundamentalist Non-naturalism
  Examining a fundamentalist approach to non-naturalism.
• 4.3 Grounded Non-naturalism
  Exploring grounded non-naturalism as an alternative.
• 4.4 Essentially Grounded Non-naturalism
  Further exploration of the essence of grounded non-naturalism.
• 4.5 Avoiding Bruteness Revenge
  Addressing criticisms against non-naturalism, specifically the “bruteness” objection.
• 4.6 Conclusion
  Wrapping up the discussion on non-naturalism.

5. The Grounding Argument against Non-reductive Moral Realism

• 5.1 The Supervenience Argument
  Examining the supervenience argument against non-reductive moral realism.
• 5.2 Normative Supervenience
  Discussing how normativity supervenes on natural properties.
• 5.3 Hyperintensional Differences
  Addressing issues related to hyperintensional differences in moral discourse.
• 5.4 The Grounding Argument
  Presenting the grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism.
• 5.5 Interlude on Reduction
  A brief exploration of reduction in the context of moral realism.
• 5.6 Normative Grounding
  Examining how moral facts may be grounded.
• 5.7 Amalgamating Normative Grounds
  Exploring the synthesis of multiple normative grounds.
• 5.8 Conditional Normative Grounds
  Analyzing conditionality in moral grounding.
• 5.9 Ethical Idlers?
  Investigating cases where ethical grounding may seem non-essential.
• 5.10 Conclusion
  Concluding thoughts on the grounding argument.

6. What is a Moral Law?

• 6.1 The Grounding Problem in Metaethics
  Discussing the grounding problem within metaethical theory.
• 6.2 Normative Grounding
  Deepening the discussion on the nature of normative grounding.
• 6.3 Bridge-law Non-naturalism
  Introducing bridge-law non-naturalism as a solution.
• 6.4 What is a Moral Law?
  Defining moral laws and their nature.
• 6.5 Normative Necessity
  Discussing what makes moral laws necessary.
• 6.6 When is a Moral Law?
  Investigating the conditions under which a moral law applies.
• 6.7 Why the Question Needs an Answer
  Explaining the importance of answering the question of moral laws.
• 6.8 A Preliminary Answer
  Offering a preliminary definition of moral laws.
• 6.9 A Better Proposal?
  Proposing alternatives to the initial definition.
• 6.10 A Comparison
  Comparing different proposals.
• 6.11 A Problem for Proposal 2
  Identifying issues with one of the proposals.
• 6.12 Solving the Problem
  Offering solutions to the problem identified.
• 6.13 Conclusion
  Wrapping up the discussion on moral laws.

7. Ought to Is: The Puzzle of Moral Science

• 7.1 Introduction
  Introducing the moral science puzzle.
• 7.2 Barber’s Anti-Realist Strategies
  Discussing strategies against realism in moral science.
• 7.3 Barber’s Realist-Friendly Approach
  Presenting a more realist-friendly approach to moral science.
• 7.4 Alternatives that Are Not
  Identifying alternatives to realist approaches that don’t hold.
• 7.5 Resolving the Puzzle: A Dilemma for Moral Science
  Analyzing the dilemma and potential resolutions.
• 7.6 Conclusion
  Concluding thoughts on the puzzle of moral science.

8. Disagreement Lost and Found

• 8.1 The Case Against MLD
  Presenting arguments against moral disagreement (MLD).
• 8.2 The Case Against QED
  Discussing objections to the QED (Quick Explanation of Disagreement) theory.

9. Normative Language in Context

• 9.1 Introduction
  Introducing the role of context in normative language.
• 9.2 Contextualism and Discourse Disagreement
  Exploring contextualism in moral discourse.
• 9.3 Managing the Context: Toward Discourse Contextualism
  Proposing ways to manage context in moral discussions.
• 9.4 Deontic Modals in Discourse: The Basic Account
  Discussing the role of deontic modals in moral discourse.
• 9.5 Features
  Exploring features of normative discourse.
• 9.6 Attitude Ascriptions and Normative Thought
  Analyzing how attitude ascriptions relate to moral reasoning.
• 9.7 Normative Truth
  Addressing the nature of normative truth.
• 9.8 Conclusion
  Concluding thoughts on normative language.

10. On Leaving Room for Doubt: Using Frege–Geach to Illuminate Expressivism’s Problem with Objectivity

• 10.1 Leaving Room for Doubt
  Introducing the Frege–Geach problem in expressivism.
• 10.2 The No Normative Exhaustion Thesis
  Examining the thesis about normative exhaustion.
• 10.3 The Negation Problem
  Discussing the issues with negating expressivist claims.
• 10.4 Accommodating Not Exhaustive: Strategy One
  Presenting a strategy to address expressivism’s problems.
• 10.5 Accommodating Not Exhaustive: Strategy Two
  Another strategy for accommodating expressivism’s challenges.
• 10.6 Conclusion
  Wrapping up the discussion on expressivism and objectivity.

11. Expressivism and Varieties of Normativity

• 11.1 Setting the Stage
  Introducing expressivism in the context of normative theory.
• 11.2 Expressivism Sans Character
  Exploring expressivism without a focus on character.
• 11.3 Semantic Expressivism
  Examining semantic expressivism and its implications.
• 11.4 Meta-semantic Expressivism
  Discussing meta-semantic issues in expressivism.
• 11.5 The Expressivist’s Dilemma
  The core dilemmas facing expressivists.
• 11.6 Pragmatic Expressivism
  A pragmatic approach to expressivism.
• 11.7 Conclusion
  Concluding thoughts on expressivism and normativity.

12. The Predicament of Choice: Ralph Wedgwood

• 12.1 Rationality for Finite Thinkers
  Examining rational decision-making for finite thinkers.
• 12.2 Thinking of Options
  Discussing the cognitive process of considering options.
• 12.3 Deciding How to Decide?
  The dilemma of how to approach decision-making.
• 12.4 Is Thinking of More Options Itself Just Another Option?
  Exploring whether considering more options complicates the process.
• 12.5 The Proposed Solution
  Presenting a potential solution to the predicament of choice.
• 12.6 Isn’t This Solution Also Excessively Idealized?
  Critiquing the proposed solution for idealization.
• 12.7 Conclusion
  Concluding remarks on the decision-making dilemma.

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