The given : Experience and its Content 1st Edition by Michelle 0191065722 9780191065729

The given : Experience and its Content 1st Edition by Michelle Montague – Ebook Instant Download/Delivery ISBN(s): 0191065722,  9780191065729

Product details:

• ISBN 10: 0191065722
• ISBN 13: 9780191065729
• Author: Michelle

What is given to us in conscious experience? The Given is an attempt to answer this question and in this way contribute to a general theory of mental content. The content of conscious experience is understood to be absolutely everything that is given to one, experientially, in the having of an experience. Michelle Montague focuses on the analysis of conscious perception, conscious emotion, and conscious thought, and deploys three fundamental notions in addition to the fundamental notion of content: the notions of intentionality, phenomenology, and consciousness. She argues that all experience essentially involves all four things, and that the key to an adequate general theory of what is given in experience–of ‘the given’–lies in giving a correct specification of the nature of these four things and the relations between them. Montague argues that conscious perception, conscious thought, and conscious emotion each have a distinctive, irreducible kind of phenomenology–what she calls ‘sensory phenomenology’, ‘cognitive phenomenology’, and ‘evaluative phenomenology’ respectively–and that these kinds of phenomenology are essential in accounting for the intentionality of these mental phenomena.

Table of contents:

1. Intentionality, Phenomenology, Consciousness, and Content

1.1 Intentionality, Phenomenology, and Consciousness

1.2 Intentionality and Content

1.3 Conclusion

2. A Brentanian Theory of Content

2.1 What Is Given in Experience

3. Awareness of Awareness

3.1 Accounts of Awareness of Awareness

3.2 Summary of Chapters 1–3

4. P. F. Strawson’s Datum

4.1 The Transparency Thesis

4.2 The Datum

5. Brentanianism, Standard Representationalism, and Fregean Representationalism

5.1 General Representationalism

5.2 Standard Representationalism and Fregeanism

5.3 Back to Brentanianism

6. Perception of Physical Objects: The Phenomenological Particularity Fact

6.1 The Phenomenological Particularity Fact

6.2 Object-positing

7. Perception of Physical Objects: The Access Problem

7.1 The Access Problem

7.2 Russell’s Principle

7.3 The Matching View

7.4 Evans and Demonstrative Identification

7.5 The Limits of Error: How Wrong Can One Be?

7.6 Objections and Responses

7.7 Not a Hallucination

8. Cognitive Phenomenology: What Is Given in Conscious Thought

8.1 What Cognitive Phenomenology Is and Isn’t

8.2 Conscious Thought and Unconscious Thought

8.3 Access-consciousness and Cognitive Accessibility

8.4 Against Cognitive Phenomenology: The Sensory Phenomenology Proposal

8.5 The Givenness of Conscious Thought: Cognitive-phenomenological Content, Internal Representational Content, and External Representational Content

9. Evaluative Phenomenology: What Is Given in Conscious Emotion

9.1 Representation of Emotion-Value Properties and Evaluative Phenomenology

9.2 Awareness of Awareness and Evaluative Phenomenology

9.3 Fine-grained Evaluative Phenomenology

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