With without or against the state how European regions play the Brussels game 1st Edition by Michaël Tatham 0191076325 9780191076329

1: Regions and the Brussels Game

1.1 Empirical Puzzle

1.2 Theoretical Puzzle

1.3 Contextualization—The ‘Third Level’, Europeanization, and ‘Multi-level Governance’ Lit

1.3.1 A New Territorial Order: Waiting for Godot?

1.3.2 Europeanization and Territorial Heterogeneity

1.3.3 The Rise of Multi-level Governance

2: Research Question, Hypotheses, and Theoretical Framework

2.1 Dependent Variable and Definitions

2.2 Hypotheses

2.2.1 Devolution of Powers—Hypothesis 1

2.2.2 Preference Intensity Configurations—Hypothesis 2

2.2.3 Party Political Configurations—Hypothesis 3

2.3 Theoretical Framework

2.3.1 The Strategic Choice Approach

2.3.2 Applying the Strategic Choice Approach

2.3.3 Specifying Model Assumptions and Actor Preferences

2.3.4 Devolution and the definition of a sub-state ‘interest’

2.3.5 Triangulation as a Method

2.4 Methodological Challenges

2.4.1 Devolution and Endogeneity

2.4.2 Preference Intensity and Endogeneity

2.4.3 Time as a Variable

3: Paradiplomacy with Adjectives? Revisiting Sub-state Interest Representation in Brussels

3.1 Six Types of Hypotheses on Brussels Paradiplomacy

3.2 Variable Operationalization and Data

3.2.1 The Survey Instrument

3.2.2 Variable Operationalization

3.3 Results

3.3.1 Understanding the Determinants of Cooperative and Non-interactive Interest Representation

3.3.2 Understanding the Determinants of Conflicting Interest Representation

3.3.3 Testing for Preference Intensity Levels and Configurations

3.3.3.1 TESTING FOR VARYING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCE INTENSITY LEVELS AT THE SUB-STATE LEVEL

3.3.3.2 TESTING FOR VARYING CONFIGURATIONS OF PREFERENCE INTENSITY LEVELS

3.3.3.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON THE IMPACT OF PREFERENCE INTENSITY

3.3.4 Overall Findings

3.4 Discussion

3.4.1 Robustness and Generalizability of Findings

3.4.2 Limitations

3.4.3 Two Further Avenues

3.5 Conclusions

4: Qualitative Design and Data

4.1 Variable Operationalization

4.1.1 Dependent Variable Operationalization

4.1.2 Independent Variable Operationalization

4.2 A Quasi-experimental Design Applied to the UK

4.3 Comparative Statics

4.3.1 Selection of Cases

4.4 Qualitative Interview Data

5: The UK Laboratory

5.1 Experiment I: Applying the Devolution Treatment

5.1.1 Data

5.1.2 Scotland and Wales (Treatment Group)—Very Little Conflict and Strong Cooperation

5.1.3 English Regions (Control Group)—Non-interaction and Some Inconspicuous Conflicts

5.1.4 Hypothesis Evaluation: The Impact of Devolution

5.1.5 Non-mitigating Factors: Preference Intensities and Party Politics

5.1.6 Experiment I Conclusions

5.2 Experiment II: Applying the Party Politics Treatment

5.2.1 Data

5.2.2 The Impact of the Party Politics Treatment and Mitigating Factors

5.2.2.1 THE FORMALIZATION OF STATE AND SUB-STATE INTERACTIONS

5.2.2.2 INCREASED AUTONOMY

5.2.2.3 COOPERATION (STILL) TRUMPS ALL

5.2.2.4 CONCLUSIONS ON MAY 2007: GREATER IMPACT AT HOME THAN ABROAD

5.2.3 Experiment II Conclusions: A Difference of Degree Rather than Kind

5.3 Overall Conclusions of the UK Quasi-experiments

6: France, Alsace, and Rhône-Alpes

6.1 Data

6.2 Mostly Non-interaction, Little Conflict, and Little Cooperation

6.2.1 Characterization of the Dependent Variable: Mostly Non-interaction

6.2.2 Intérêt Général Versus Regional Interests? The French Statist Model

6.2.3 Agricultural Professional Organizations and Devolution Levels

6.2.4 Threshold Effects and Institutional Change

6.3 Conclusions

7: Austria and Salzburg

7.1 Data

7.2 Complete Cooperation at Home Hence Little Coordination Abroad

7.2.1 Characterization of the Dependent Variable: Cooperation at Home, Non-interaction in Brussels

7.2.2 Cooperative Federalism Rather than Weak Federalism: The Depth of Domestic Cooperation on EU Af

7.2.3 The Persistence of Direct Interest Representation in Brussels

7.2.4 Joint-decision Trap, Lowest Common Denominator, and Heterogeneity of Preferences

7.2.4.1 THE PREVALENCE OF TECHNICAL OVER POLITICAL COORDINATION

7.2.4.2 HETEROGENEITY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PREFERENCES

7.2.4.3 INTERDEPENDENCE + ITERATION = COOPERATION

7.2.4.4 SHARED INCENTIVES: WHEN THE FEDERAL LEVEL ALSO GAINS FROM COOPERATION

7.2.5 Tensions Under the Microscope: Division of Competences, Subsidiarity, and European Integration

7.3 Conclusions from the Salzburg and Austria Case Study

8: State and Sub-state Interest Representation: Results from a Mixed Methods Approach

8.1 Triangulation, Hypotheses Assessment, and Refinement

8.1.1 Values on the Dependent Variable and Model Assumptions

8.1.2 Hypothesis 1—Devolution of Powers

8.1.3 Hypothesis 2—Preference Intensity Configurations

8.1.4 Hypothesis 3—Party Political Configurations

8.2 Devolution Overrides All

8.2.1 The Missing Piece of the French Jigsaw

8.2.2 The Preponderance of Devolution over Political Incongruence: An Insignificant Interaction Effe

8.3 Regional Mobilization and the Myth of Conflict

8.3.1 State–Region Conflict in Brussels

8.3.2 Shedding Light on the Obscure: Accounting for the Death of a Myth

8.4 Comparative Research and the Myth of ‘Exceptionalism’

8.5 Differentiation and Variation: Towards More Nuanced Findings

9: Playing the Game: Implications, Validity, and Limits

9.1 Summary of Key Findings

9.2 Policy and Theoretical Implications

9.3 Generalization: External Validity and Limits

9.4 Future Avenues of Research